How does one explain the fact that the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has made Bangladesh a focus of its democracy promotion efforts by dangling the threat of visa sanctions against officials who undermine free elections while staying silent on the undeclared martial law situation in Pakistan, where mass arrests, disappearances and torture have become political weapons? The short answer is that U.S. promotion of democratic rights has long been selective, with geopolitical considerations often dominant. The pursuit of moral legitimacy for the cause of democracy promotion has also contributed to making sanctions the tool of choice for U.S. policymakers. In the case of Bangladesh, the Biden administration is seeking to leverage two other factors: that close relatives of many Bangladeshi politicians live in the U.S. or Britain, including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's son who holds an American green card; and that the bulk of Bangladesh's exports go to the West, with the U.S. the top destination. Few can object to what Secretary of State Antony Blinken says is the U.S. goal: that Bangladesh's next election in early 2024 is free and fair. However, his threat to withhold visas from individuals "responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process" is hardly conducive to the promotion of this aim. If anything, it is likely to prove counterproductive. Hasina, daughter of the country's independence leader and first head of state, contends that the U.S. is pursuing a strategy of regime change in her country. "They are trying to eliminate democracy and introduce a government that will not have a democratic existence," she told parliament in April. "It will be an undemocratic action." Leading a secular government since 2009 that Bangladesh's Islamists detest, Hasina has given the country political stability and rapid economic growth, although the global economic fallout from the Ukraine war is now weighing on the country's finances. Bangladesh's impressive growth trajectory stands in stark contrast to the chronic political and economic turmoil seen in Pakistan, which today is teetering on the brink of default. Yet while Bangladesh was excluded from the Summits for Democracy convened in 2021 and earlier this year by Biden, Pakistan was invited both times though it did not attend either. While continuing to reward Pakistan by prioritizing short-term geopolitical considerations, the Biden administration has been criticizing democratic backsliding in Bangladesh. In 2021, it designated Bangladesh's elite Rapid Action Battalion and six of its current and former leaders as complicit in, or engaged in, serious human rights abuses in relation to the country's war on drugs, effectively freezing all their assets in the U.S. In December, Peter Haas, the U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh, insolently demanded that the authorities investigate a deadly clash between police and members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which is the country's largest opposition party and has allied itself with radical Islamist parties. More recently, Blinken told Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Abdul Momen of his "concerns about violence against, and intimidation of, the media and civil society," according to a State Department statement. Blinken's wielding of the visa-sanctions stick is clearly aimed at members of Hasina's government, including law enforcement and other security officials, although the announcement of the new policy also mentioned members of opposition parties. But sanctioning foreign officials usually serves no more than a symbolic purpose while hampering diplomacy. It can also have unintended consequences. Earlier this month, Beijing rebuffed Washington's request for a meeting in Singapore between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Gen. Li Shangfu, his Chinese counterpart. Beijing cited Li's presence on a U.S. sanctions list to which he was added five years before his appointment in March as defense minister. It could even be argued that U.S. sanctions against Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar military, alongside three other senior commanders, contributed to the coup that ousted the country's civilian government in 2021, as the generals may have felt they had little to lose personally by going ahead. Added sanctions since then have only exacerbated Myanmar's internal situation and driven the country closer to China. From Myanmar and Iran to Belarus and Cuba, U.S. sanctions have failed to bring about political change. The relative decline of American influence and the ongoing shift in global power from the West to the East are making U.S.-led sanctions less and less effective. However, with the West still controlling the global financial architecture and the dollar remaining the world's primary reserve currency, sanctions are still an attractive option for American policymakers. The new hard line toward Dhaka makes little sense. The Hasina government could be a significant partner in the U.S. war on terror and in improving Asian security. Instead, bilateral relations are under strain. No one from the Biden administration even met with Hasina when she visited Washington last month for discussions with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. While in Singapore this month, Austin declared that America "will not flinch in the face of bullying or coercion" from China. But bullying and coercion are also unlikely to advance U.S. interests in Bangladesh. In fact, bullying the world's seventh-most populous country, far from helping to promote a free and fair election, is more likely to revive painful memories of how the U.S. looked the other way in 1971 as the Pakistani military brutally resisted Bangladesh's efforts to achieve independence from Islamabad, slaughtering up to 3 million people. What is Washington really after now? Source: asia.nikkei.com

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has expressed disappointed over the Taliban de facto administration announcement being exclusive and included members from past Taliban regime. UNSC Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Deborah Lyons while briefing UNSC members on situation in Afghanistan said: “We are faced, as of two days ago, with a de facto administration announced by the Taliban. Those who hoped for, and urged for, inclusivity will be disappointed.” “There are no women in the names listed. There are no non-Taliban members, no figures from the past government, nor leaders of minority groups. Instead, it contains many of the same figures who were part of the Taliban leadership from 1996 to 2001.” What is of immediate and practical importance to those around this table is that of the 33 names presented, many are on the United Nations sanctions list, including the prime minister, the two deputy prime ministers, and the foreign minister. All of you will need to decide which steps to take regarding the sanctions list, and the impact on future engagement. Firstly, we must focus on the pre-existing humanitarian crisis, mostly in rural areas, that is indeed worsening as we speak. Addressing this crisis cannot wait for political decisions regarding the removal of sanctions. Millions of ordinary Afghans are in desperate need of help. This means that needed humanitarian aid must be provided through the United Nations or NGOs. There are in addition countries that have their own sanctions that apply to certain members or groups that are now part of the de facto authority. Relevant mechanisms must be found quickly to allow for the United Nations organizations and NGOs to provide the necessary humanitarian relief. In the meantime, we look forward to the high-level conference in Geneva on September 13, which the Secretary-General will convene, that seeks pledges to meet the requirements of the humanitarian appeal on which Afghan lives now depend. In the current environment the UN role must be clear and build on our humanitarian imperative. There is an immediate and pressing need to deliver, on a huge scale, essential humanitarian aid in areas such as health, food security, non-food items, and sanitation. Secondly, there is an additional, looming crisis to which I must draw your attention. Billions of assets and donor funds have been frozen by members of the international community. The understandable purpose is to deny these funds to the de facto Taliban administration. Inevitable effect, however, will be a severe economic downturn that could throw many more millions into poverty and hunger, may generate a massive wave of refugees from Afghanistan, and indeed set Afghanistan back for generations. As well, as the Afghan currency plummeted, prices of fuel and food have skyrocketed. Private banks no longer have cash to distribute, meaning even Afghans with assets cannot access them. Salaries cannot be paid. Afghanistan, heavily import-dependent, will be unable to finance its imports of food and medicine, as well as fuel, electricity, and other essential items. A modus vivendi must be found, and quickly, that allows money to flow to Afghanistan to prevent a total breakdown of the economy and social order. Safeguards must be created to ensure that this money is spent where it needs to be spent, and not misused by the de facto authorities. The economy must be allowed to breathe for a few more months, giving the Taliban a chance to demonstrate flexibility and a genuine will to do things differently this time, notably from a human rights, gender, and counter-terrorism perspective. “I mentioned, we are disappointed in the lack of inclusivity of the so-called caretaker cabinet, but the new reality in Afghanistan is in fact still being shaped. A mixed picture has formed in the weeks since the Taliban took power.” For the most part, and with some exceptions, the premises of the United Nations in Afghanistan have been respected. We are, however, increasingly worried by the growing number of incidents of harassment and intimidation against our national staff. We will continue to do everything possible to support our staff and keep them from harm’s way. The UN cannot conduct its work—work that is so essential to the Afghan people—if its personnel are subjected to intimidation, fear for their lives, and cannot move freely. “We are also concerned that despite the many statements granting general amnesties to ANDSF personnel and those who have worked as civil servants, there have been credible allegations of reprisal killings of ANDSF personnel, and the detention of officials who worked for previous administrations.” “We have received reports of members of the Taliban carrying out house-to-house searches and seizing property, particularly in Kabul. And while the Taliban have provided many assurances that they will respect the rights of women within Islam, we are receiving increasing reports where the Taliban have prohibited women from appearing in public places without male chaperones and prevented women from working.” They have limited girls’ access to education in some regions and dismantled the Departments of Women’s Affairs across Afghanistan, as well as targeting women’s NGOs. We are also extremely disturbed at the increasing violence used against Afghans who are protesting Taliban rule. This violence includes shooting above the crowds, persistent beatings, intimidation of media, and other repressive measures. Instead, the Taliban should seek to understand the legitimate grievances of these many Afghans who fear for their futures. Despite these concerns perhaps we can still help to shape this new reality into a more positive direction. In our initial engagements with Taliban leaders over this past year and in most recent weeks, we have received a clear message that they need and want international assistance. Some indeed have asked for patience and even advice as they attempt to transition from a military insurgency to a government. They have complained that the widespread corruption of previous government officials left many parts of the country without assistance and squandered the generosity of the international community. But they themselves risk squandering the potential generosity of the international community if they govern against the explicit interests and rights of their own people. The impact of these recent developments is also felt beyond the Afghan borders. Many countries around Afghanistan are apprehensive about how Taliban rule will affect their own security. They fear the effect of an expanded Islamic State that the Taliban cannot contain. They fear a wave of refugees coming across their borders. They fear the consequences of the large amount of arms left behind in Afghanistan. They fear that the Taliban will be unable to stem the illegal economy and the flow of drugs from Afghanistan. It is indeed most important now that the region use its available mechanisms to not just speak with one voice but act in concert for the benefit of the entire region. We look forward to the upcoming meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Dushanbe. Other mechanisms include the Extended Troika format created by Moscow, which last met most recently in Qatar in early August, or ad hoc mechanisms such as the regional foreign ministers meeting hosted by Pakistan that took place this week. But it is also important that the wider international community not become irrevocably divided. There is now a more urgent agenda for the regional and international cooperation around Afghanistan. Without it, the negative repercussions will be felt near and far and will be much more difficult to address later on. A key part of this agenda is counter-terrorism. Al Qaeda members remain in Afghanistan, visibly welcomed and sheltered by the de facto Taliban authorities. Islamic State Khorasan Province remains active and could gain strength. Concerns on these essential matters of international terrorism will not be allayed simply by Taliban promises. On this issue the region and the wider international community share a clear common and critical interest. The United Nations family remains in Afghanistan, committed to do what we have done for the last seventy-five years, delivering for the people of Afghanistan. What is essential for this effort, and for Afghanistan in general, is a functioning airport in Kabul. “We are grateful therefore for the prompt and generous actions taken by Qatar and Turkey to begin restoring the airport, in cooperation with the Taliban, so that it is fully functional and regular commercial flights can resume. Thanks to these efforts, the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service is already in a position to begin making regular flights to Kabul, and UNAMA’s own air fleet will soon be able to do so as well.” “I would also like to thank the Government of Kazakhstan for agreeing on short notice to host a UN satellite office to support our efforts in Afghanistan. Our commitment to deliver to the people of Afghanistan means that we must engage with the Taliban on operational and security issues. The recent visit of Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths to Kabul earlier this week paved the way to continue discussing the terms of future humanitarian assistance as well as to prepare the ground for the Geneva conference on the 13th.” “I cannot express enough my admiration for those UN staff, national and international, who are in Afghanistan now, facing the daily uncertainties. Their presence and their persistence are proof of our ongoing commitment to deliver to the people of Afghanistan. I would also like to make a final comment on the subject of UNAMA’s mandate, which is due for renewal in about a week. You as members of the Security Council are, like us, still evaluating the new situation.” “I look forward to our ongoing discussions regarding the UN’s role in Afghanistan at this critical time and as we move forward. Mr. President, The best, and still possible outcome, would be for the Taliban to demonstrate that they seek to create an Afghanistan where people do not live in fear, where those with talents are invited to participate in the rebuilding of their country, and where boys and girls, young women and men, can receive the sort of education that will allow this development to continue. “Now is the moment for the Taliban to visibly demonstrate to the people of Afghanistan—to all the people of Afghanistan—that they are committed to each and every one of them, in guaranteeing their safety, their freedoms, their health, their education, and their future prosperity. The Afghan people are least responsible for this unfolding crisis, and yet most affected by it. It is clear that they will still need this Council and the international community.” Source: Pajhwok